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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
bankruptcy. Statutes of the type found in the instant case' are
subject to the criticism that, standing alone, they fail to give protection to the judgment creditor who has already been injured. North
Dakota meets this situation by allowing recourse to an unsatisfied
judgment fund when the judgment debtor has no resources with
which to pay, and the judgment is more than $300.00 and less than
$10,000.00.' Massachusetts has met the situation by requiring compulsory liability insurance of all drivers.9 This method, however, is
open to the objection that it amounts to a subsidization of insurance
companies or represents an instance of the state itself going into the
insurance business. Nevertheless, it would appear that the requirement of compulsory liability insurance offers greater protection, at
least in the case of residents of the state, than an unsatisfied judgment fund, since there is no minimum amount which is not covered.
Veloyce G. Winslow.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE POWER OF MUNICIPALITYVALIDITY OF ORDINANCE DECLARING DOOR-TO-DOOR SOLICITING A NUISANCE-Appellant, representing a national magazine
subscription company in charge of a crew of solicitors, was sentenced
and fined by appellee city for violation of a city ordinance declaring
that the going in and upon private residences within the city by
solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient vendors
of merchandise without request or invitation, for the soliciting of
orders or sale or disposal of their merchandise to be a misdemeanor
and punishable as such. The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the
conviction and fine, whereupon appellant attacked the constitutionality of the ordinance in the United States Supreme Court. In finding
the ordinance constitutional, over two dissents, the court held that it
was not violative of due process, commerce clause or freedom of
speech and press. While admitting that the knocker on the door is
an invitation or license to attempt an entry, the court decided that
frequent visits become a nuisance. Breard v. City of Alexandria, 71
S.Ct. 920 (1951).
Here involved is the ordinance commonly known in both lay and
legal circles as the Green River ordinance because of its origin in
Green River, Wyoming, in 1931. Its widespread adoption has produced
a sharp conflict between the local police power and persons engaged
in businesses which go directly to the prospective customer in his
home. It represents a phase of the municipal police power which
concededly is justified insofar as it relates to public health, morals,
S

N.D. Rev. Code c. 39-16 (Supp. 1949).
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RECENT CASES
safety, welfare and convenience.' However, the relation must be
reasonable,' not arbitrary or discriminatory.' Local law can regulate
the use of streets' and sidewalks' and prohibit their use altogether
for purposes of sales or solicitation where the geographical classification is reasonable.' House to house peddling, soliciting and canvassing too are subject to reasonable police regulation and licensing.'
Heretofore, authorities have split upon the constitutionality of
the Green River ordinance. It has been upheld in its state of origin,'
federal circuit court,' and a few other states." It has been declared
unconstitutional in many state courts." The bases of the decisions
adverse to the ordinance are that it is discriminatory" and violative
of due process." The recent United States -Supreme Court decision in
the instant case brushed these decisions aside with little regard for
the cogent reasoning contained in them. While the majority considers
this ordinance to be merely regulatory, the dissent of Chief Justice
Vinson more realistically recognized it as a flat prohibition of solicitation, a fact admitted by the supreme court of Louisiana' when this
case was before it. The dissent also points out that the United States
Supreme Court regards the solicitation of orders for goods produced
in another state to be interstate commerce as much as the transportation of those goods." To reconcile the present decision with this
reaffirmed " view is difficult at best. Federal courts ordinarily look
critically at statutes or ordinances which tend to discriminate against
interstate commerce," and unhesitatingly strike down those which
do." Despite the commendable purpose professed for the ordinance,
and apparent absence of discrimination on its face, there is undeniably
discrimination in fact.
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In the instant case there is also involved, but not discussed, the
issue as to whether a municipality can transform by ordinance that
which has always been a legitimate business into a public nuisance."
Such an extension of the general concept of what constitutes a public
nuisance7 could easily be considered unwarranted, even though the
police power extends beyond morals, health and safety to encompass
protection to the well-being and tranquility of the community.n The
nuisance here, if an actual nuisance, tends to be private rather than
public." As such it is not subject to abatement by the municipality
through a criminal ordinance.' It seems harsh to make criminal, by
failure to strictly construe a penal statute,' the proscribed conduct
which has always been a legitimate business.
The finality of federal decisions on constitutional issues would
seem to place the future of the transient business man squarely in the
hands of the local lawmakers, often composed of, or dominated or
influenced by local business men. However, the impact of this recent
decision may not be as broad or severe as it appears to be. State
courts have declared this ordinance invalid on the grounds that municipalities have only delegated powers;' nuisances are defined only by
common law or statute;' that the municipality was unauthorized to
make it unlawful to carry on a lawful trade in a lawful manner," or
that such ordinances were unwarranted." In these states the constitutional arguments are unnecessary and federal jurisdiction can be
avoided. Where state courts uphold the ordinance the only satisfactory solution would appear to be legislation protecting householders who indicate a desire not to be disturbed, but allowing those
who have no objection to be solicited in their homes.
Frank J. Kosanda
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